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63 
PRIVACY COMMITMENTS 
Rachel Wilka* 
Abstract: What responsibilities do corporations have with regard to their consumers’ 
information? Many articles have looked at ways to make personal information the “property” 
of the consumer. Property approaches attempt to overlay personal information on the legal 
frameworks of trade secret, trademark, and copyright law. While each approach has its 
merits, and contributes to the field, none of the proposals generate a concrete way for a 
consumer to enforce his or her rights against a company. The proposals all suffer from the 
same fatal flaw, a new system must not just create a consumer right but also balance the 
inequities in bargaining power between a consumer and a large corporation. 
In patent law, there are similar conflicts of interest between a private property owner’s 
(patent holder’s) right to create a successful business and the ability of others (potential 
patent licensees) to negotiate a reasonable royalty rate. In response to this conflict, the patent 
field relies upon a self-regulatory system where patent holders agree to be “Reasonable and 
Non-Discriminatory” in their licensing practices. This system produces two concrete 
benefits. First, it helps correct the power imbalance between two negotiating parties. Second, 
it creates a third-party breach of contract right for a party who could not normally bring a 
case. As a process, a patent holder agrees to Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory practices 
(“RAND”) with a standards-setting organization. Then, if the patent holder does not 
reasonably license their patent to a third party who wishes to negotiate for said license, the 
third party can sue the patent holder, even though the two parties never finalized an 
agreement. 
This paper argues a similar system would lend much-needed structure to online data use. 
Creating a voluntary, quasi-self-regulatory regime would allow greater transparency as to 
corporate data practices, facilitate the creation of industry standards as to “reasonable” data 
use, balance the interests of corporation and consumer, and create a legal right for consumers 
who have had their personal data misused (in a way that could more easily support a class-
action). The paper proceeds in four parts. The first part looks at current norms of data use and 
the issues a proposed system would need to address. The second part reviews and 
summarizes past intellectual property approaches to privacy, as well as each approach’s 
respective drawbacks. The third part examines RAND commitments and their operation in 
the realm of patent law. The fourth part discusses a system for implementing RAND 
commitments in privacy law, and addresses potential benefits and drawbacks of the 
approach. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Current privacy laws chase technological advances, and seem 
perennially unable to provide consumers effective ways to protect their 
privacy interests.1 The insufficiencies in privacy law are not a simple 
outcome of a dearth of statute or regulation.2 Specific laws may protect 
privacy in specific contexts, but lawmakers continually create legal 
requirements with similar flaws: (1) application to a limited 
demographic; (2) overly vague or easily avoided definitions of 
“violation of privacy”; (3) protection of limited types of “personally 
identifiable information” (PII); and/or (4) avoidance of meaningful 
requirements through overly generous safe harbors.3 
A. Consumers Need to Know How Their Data Is Being Used 
In any discussion of privacy practices, the biggest hurdle to achieving 
better, privacy-respecting, data use practices and regulation is getting the 
technology sector to care about, and invest in, privacy.4 Without 
corporate buy-in, privacy practices will continue to rely on outdated 
privacy laws and enforcement by overworked government agencies. The 
best way to motivate “big-tech” is to empower and mobilize consumers 
to pressure the private sector into creating meaningful protections. To do 
                                                      
1. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1146 (2002). 
2. Id. at 1090. 
3. Id. at 1088–89 (discussing the problems with the definition of privacy described); Andrew 
Chin & Anne Klinefelter, Differential Privacy as a Response to the Reidentification Threat: The 
Facebook Advertiser Case Study, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1418, 1426 n.37 (2012) (“noting that the FTC’s 
proposals are ‘supported by a wide cross section of roundtable participants who stated that the 
traditional distinction between PII and non-PII continues to lose significance due to changes in 
technology and the ability to re-identify consumers from supposedly anonymous data’” (quoting 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 43 (Dec. 
2010), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/HYZ4-EEND])).  
4. Joseph Turow, Google Still Doesn’t Care About Your Privacy, FORTUNE (June 28, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/06/28/gmail-google-account-ads-privacy-concerns-home-settings-policy/ 
[https://perma.cc/U88P-NBUP]. 
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so, consumers must first understand what they are fighting for—in other 
words, why privacy matters. 
Until recently, consumers were apathetic to digital privacy practices.5 
They did not read companies’ privacy policies6 or see big data affecting 
their analog lives. As Donald Rumsfeld phrased it, “As we know, there 
are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know 
there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things 
we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we 
don’t know we don’t know.”7 Until recently, the average digital 
consumer only knew about the “known-knowns” of data use, like 
Facebook using his or her data to personalize shoe advertisements. The 
average consumer viewed corporate data use as innocuous and 
ignorable. As a result, companies saw no need to invest in privacy 
protections on the consumers’ behalf. 
The landscape has now changed. The “unknowns” have emerged. 
Data breaches expose credit card information,8 medical histories and 
prescription lists,9 financial holdings and home addresses,10 and personal 
e-mails.11 Over the course of 2014, 47% of U.S. adults, or 110 million 
                                                      
5. Greg Satell, Let’s Face It, We Don’t Really Care About Privacy, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2014, 12:38 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregsatell/2014/12/01/lets-face-it-we-dont-really-care-about-
privacy/#53ea22825698 [https://perma.cc/P297-YXYZ]; Hayley Tsukayama, People Care More 
About Convenience than Privacy Online, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/10/07/people-care-more-about-
convenience-than-privacy-online/?utm_term=.a889c2c591a6 [https://perma.cc/AWB9-V5FV].  
6. Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t Know What a Privacy Policy Is, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR.: FACT TANK (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/04/half-of-
americans-dont-know-what-a-privacy-policy-is/ [https://perma.cc/2GBZ-4GPB].  
7. David A. Graham, Rumsfeld’s Knowns and Unknowns: The Intellectual History of a Quip, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/03/rumsfelds-knowns-
and-unknowns-the-intellectual-history-of-a-quip/359719/ [https://perma.cc/WH9H-XBQ6].  
8. Brian Krebs, The Target Breach, by the Numbers, KREBS ON SECURITY, (May 6, 2014 12:24 
AM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/05/the-target-breach-by-the-numbers/ 
[https://perma.cc/C75X-BLFF]. 
9. Coral Garnick, Premera Negligent in Data Breach, 5 Lawsuits Claim, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 
27, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/premera-negligent-in-data-breach-5-lawsuits-
claim/ [https://perma.cc/B6HY-9TPW]; Shannon Pettypiece, Sony Hack Reveals Health Details on 
Employees, Children, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 11, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-11/sony-hack-reveals-health-details-on-
employees-and-their-children (last visited June 11, 2018).  
10. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Matthew Goldstein, & Nicole Perlroth, JPMorgan Chase Hacking 
Affects 76 Million Households, N.Y. TIMES: DEAL BOOK (Oct. 2, 2014, 12:50 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/jpmorgan-discovers-further-cyber-security-issues/ 
[https://perma.cc/JE8Y-9SG9]. 
11. Elizabeth Weise, Hijackers Get up Close and Personal with Hacked Accounts, USA TODAY 
(Nov. 6, 2014, 10:08 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/11/06/email-hijacking-
phishing-google/18564671/ [https://perma.cc/SN3Y-L6DF]. 
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individuals, had their personal data stolen.12 By 2017, approximately the 
same proportion of Americans were affected by the Equifax hack 
alone.13 Outside of data breaches, companies argue that data distributed 
to partners is anonymized, but in the Human Genome Project, a 
respected medical study, between 84–97% of participants could be re-
identified (i.e., their names could be connected to their individual 
“anonymized” data).14 
Unless users gain insight into how their data is being used, and where 
it is going, they cannot make an informed choice as to which companies 
can access their data. Moreover, because companies may share data with 
other parties without the user’s knowledge, the user’s choice of which 
services to use may be moot. The data could be transmitted to companies 
the user consciously chose to avoid by the services he or she is choosing 
to use. As big data starts affecting our non-digital lives, respect for 
privacy, and responsible data use more broadly, becomes increasingly 
important. Consumer data analytics, based on collective user data, 
impacts every aspect of our lives including not only areas like marketing, 
but also our career,15 credit score,16 and exposure to targeted, deceptive 
information.17 The era of privacy as a theoretical concern is over; big data 
is here to affect our lives. It is either control, or be controlled by, big data. 
B. Big Data Negatively Affects the Offline World 
Big data uses affect our non-digital lives in countless ways every day. 
Big data may affect the job-interview process to judge whether an 
applicant has the right “culture fit” with a company,18 what college a high 
                                                      
12. Jose Pagliery, Half of American Adults Hacked This Year, CNNMONEY (May 28, 2014), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/28/technology/security/hack-data-breach/ [https://perma.cc/NN6F-
7FUF]. 
13. Ryan Grenoble, 2017 Was the Year of Hacks. 2018 Probably Won’t Be Better, HUFFPOST 
(Dec. 30, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/data-breach-
hacks_us_5a3a7f56e4b025f99e13cdbe [https://perma.cc/L9BG-LVM4]. 
14. LATANYA SWEENEY, AKUA ABU & JULIA WINN, HARVARD UNIV. DATA PRIVACY LAB, 
IDENTIFYING PARTICIPANTS IN THE PERSONAL GENOME PROJECT BY NAME 3 (2013).  
15. Tim Adams, Job Hunting Is a Matter of Big Data, Not How You Perform, GUARDIAN: THE 
OBSERVER (May 10, 2014, 4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/10/job-
hunting-big-data-interview-algorithms-employees [https://perma.cc/JL3A-YWPZ]. 
16. Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 148, 150–51 (2016). 
17. Claire Cain Miller, When Algorithms Discriminate, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (July 9, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/upshot/when-algorithms-discriminate.html 
[https://perma.cc/8C8C-TAW7]. 
18. About, ARTISIAN FOR HIRE, INC., https://artisantalent.com/about-artisan/ 
[https://perma.cc/83ZF-EXRJ]; cf. Lydia Dishman, How Big Data Might Change the Way You Find 
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school student gets into,19 and potentially even consumer credit scores.20 
Companies will argue that online services utilizing personal information 
have the ability to help consumers more than hurt them. Big data is touted 
as the solution to discrimination,21 bad bosses,22 and inaccurate or 
incomplete profiles with credit agencies.23 
However, even if big data could deliver on those promises from a 
technical or theoretical standpoint, its benefit to consumers depends on 
the truthfulness of the data. In other words, an individual’s ability to get a 
job or a mortgage can depend on the data stored by online companies and 
can conversely be negatively impacted by inaccurate information. In 
reality, data collected through normal avenues “only represents a thin 
slice of us” and 30–50% of collected online data is inaccurate.24 The 
problem is so large that the tech industry is already investing millions to 
try to solve it themselves.25 So far, industry attempts to control for quality 
have not demonstrated viability. 
The power of online companies compared to their consumers means 
users currently cannot control how data is used or how it will affect their 
lives. To begin taking control of data, users must first understand where 
data is going and who is using it. 
C. It Is Not Clear Where Companies Are Sending Data 
The difficulty of knowing how personal data is used goes beyond the 
lack of company transparency with its users—many companies currently 
                                                      
a Job, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3052639/how-big-data-
might-change-the-way-you-find-a-job [https://perma.cc/6GH2-XK6S] (discussing job seekers’ use 
of big data to gain insight into the culture of potential employers). 
19. Darian Somers, Do Colleges Look at Your Social Media Accounts?, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 10, 
2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/articles/2017-02-10/colleges-
really-are-looking-at-your-social-media-accounts (last visited June 3, 2018). 
20. Colin Wilhelm, Big Data vs. the Credit Gap, POLITICO: THE AGENDA (Feb. 7, 2018, 5:02 
AM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2018/02/07/big-data-credit-gap-000630 
[https://perma.cc/6KBC-NF9B]. 
21. MARTIN WATTENBERG, FERNANDA VIÉGAS & MORITZ HARDT, ATTACKING DISCRIMINATION 
WITH SMARTER MACHINE LEARNING,  
https://research.google.com/bigpicture/attacking-discrimination-in-ml/ [https://perma.cc/6QWH-
RPB5]. 
22. Dishman, supra note 18.  
23. Wilhelm, supra note 20. 
24. Julian Mitchell, This Data Mining Startup Empowers Consumers to Own Their Digital 
Footprint, FORBES (Jan. 25, 2017, 4:25 PM),  
https://www.forbes.com/sites/julianmitchell/2017/01/25/this-data-mining-startup-gives-consumers-
the-tools-to-own-their-digital-footprint/#554eb0f918db [https://perma.cc/QLS3-37KA]. 
25. Id.  
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do not track, or do not understand, the full scope of how their collected 
data is being used. As discussed in the previous section, one of the major 
issues with tracking data use is accounting for data breaches. Over the 
past several years, large-scale data breaches have become ubiquitous.26 
Equifax is the most recent and obvious example.27 Equifax previously 
existed as a shining example of both individuals and government putting 
trust in keeping their most sensitive data secure through the private 
sector.28 We now have no way of knowing where our full financial 
histories may be, and our only protection is monitoring after the fact to 
avoid direct financial repercussions. The underlying privacy is gone.29 
In addition to the nefarious data breach scenario, there are new 
technology advancements changing how we must think about data use. 
New technologies, including machine learning and artificial intelligence, 
ingest large amounts of data, but may save only data useful to the 
underlying algorithm(s) or only store the knowledge learned from the 
data set (i.e., a derivative predictive value).30 The data has a 
transformative effect on the technology, blurring the line between 
personal data and company innovation. 
Therefore, understanding company data use is dependent on 
companies reliably tracking data use, which is far from universal. The 
illusion of comprehensive data tracking shattered recently with 
Facebook’s admission that it allowed political targeting organizations to 
access millions of Facebook user profiles in violation of its own 
policies.31 While Facebook clearly mishandled data, its practices are 
sophisticated compared to the average startup’s blind use of data.32 A 
real solution to current lackluster privacy practices will need to not only 
solve the privacy concerns of today; it will have to be scalable, 
                                                      
26. Press Release, Identity Theft Res. Ctr., At Mid-Year, U.S. Data Breaches Increase at Record 
Pace (July 18, 2017), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/Press-Releases/2017-mid-year-data-breach-
report-press-release [https://perma.cc/9HPQ-PFAA]. 
27. Donna Borak & Kathryn Vasel, The Equifax Hack Could Be Worse than We Thought, 
CNNMONEY (Feb. 10, 2018, 10:43 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/02/09/pf/equifax-hack-senate-
disclosure/index.html [https://perma.cc/LDB8-2GZ8]. 
28. Id.  
29. Id.  
30. David Rubinstein, Where Does Big Data Go From Here?, SD TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://sdtimes.com/data/big-data-go/ [https://perma.cc/76CM-GQNP]. 
31. Matthew Rosenberg et al., How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-
campaign.html?action=click&module=Intentional&pgtype=Article (last visited June 3, 2018). 
32. See Ronald A. Klain, Proof Startups Can’t Afford to Ignore the Law, FORTUNE (Mar. 2, 
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/03/02/startups-ignore-law/ [https://perma.cc/7Q7V-52DJ]. 
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adaptable, and understandable in order to avoid being outpaced by 
technology or ignored by industry. 
D. Scholars Have Proposed Protecting Private Data as Intellectual 
Property 
Knowing the full risk of online data use, leading academics have 
proposed solving the privacy problem through intellectual property (IP) 
law frameworks, attempting to create a type of intangible property right 
in one’s personal data.33 The idea behind most of the approaches is if 
users have an ownership interest in their data, then use without 
compensation, or at least consent, would empower them by providing a 
cause of action. Previous published works considered potential systems 
based on trade secret, trademark, and copyright law.34 Prior IP 
approaches generally have not met with a great deal of success.35 
Trademark, trade secret, and copyright law just do not provide a 
practical solution to protecting privacy rights.36 
However, there is a very promising unexplored avenue of IP law: 
patent law. At first glance, the omission of a patent approach to privacy 
protection makes sense. Personal information is not an “invention” and 
even personal browsing data may not be “novel.”37 Despite the initial 
reaction that privacy law and patent law are completely incompatible 
fields, however, there is a common problem in both fields: how do you 
both respect the free market’s ability to contract for use rights and 
prevent extremely lopsided contracts resulting from unequal bargaining 
power? 
In patent law, this problem manifests as a Standard Essential Patent 
(SEP), where a piece of patented technology, generally a piece of 
software or hardware, is so integral to the industry that its use is required 
for anyone creating new technology in the space.38 This presents a 
dilemma: the company holding an SEP has a legitimate right to receive 
license revenue from the use of the invention, but the potential licensee 
does not have a meaningful alternative technology to use.39 The patent 
                                                      
33. See infra Part I. 
34. See infra Part I. 
35. See infra section I.A.2; section I.B.2; section I.C.2. 
36. See infra section I.A.2; section I.B.4; section I.C.6. 
37. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
38. Jeffrey C. Johnson, Standard Essential Patents—The Transactional Side, 86 BNA INSIGHTS 
202, 202 (May 24, 2013). 
39. Id.  
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holder is able to demand outrageous licensing fees, especially from 
current or potential competitors, which stifles the development of new 
inventions and competition for market share.40 A similar problem exists 
in privacy protection for two reasons: (1) just a handful of companies 
completely dominate categories of online services41; and (2) choice of 
service provider is often outside of the consumer’s control, as in the case 
of employers selecting a provider for employees. In the privacy context, 
however, market-dominant companies, instead of using their bargaining 
power to obtain exorbitant licensing fees, “obtain control” of users’ 
data.42 Users have to agree to a click-through, essentially waiving their 
right to challenge the company’s use of their data, similar to a potential 
licensee who could be forced to pay outlandish royalties for a patent.43 
For patents, the SEP conundrum led to a specific policy response: the 
creation of Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (RAND) 
commitments.44 In basic terms, RAND commitments are a voluntary 
obligation by a company to license its patented technology only under 
reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing terms.45 The commitment 
creates a third-party cause of action against SEP holders who refuse to 
offer potential licensees a reasonable and non-discriminatory license.46 
In the privacy context, a similar schema could speak to issues arising 
from a similar imbalance in negotiating power. However, to fully correct 
the problem, any IP approach would need to accomplish several goals. 
First, it would need to mandate accountability as to data use and sharing 
in order for the public to fully understand current practices. Second, it 
would have to address the inequities in bargaining power between an 
individual user and data-collecting companies. Third, it would need to 
represent a viable avenue for the companies themselves (i.e., not be seen 
as overly burdensome or incompatible with an industry’s ability to 
monetize). Fourth, the model must include both government regulation 
and industry self-regulating aspects, in order to allow for flexibility of 
industry norms combined with the penalties of government regulation 
                                                      
40. Id.  
41. See, e.g., Jeff Desjardins, This Chart Reveals Google’s True Dominance over the Web, 
VISUAL CAPITALIST (Apr. 20, 2018, 12:48 PM), http://www.visualcapitalist.com/this-chart-reveals-
googles-true-dominance-over-the-web/ [https://perma.cc/RG5N-MWSY]. 
42. Id.  
43. Felix T. Wu, The Constitutionality of Consumer Privacy Regulation, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
69, 71. 
44. See infra Section II discussion of RAND commitments. 
45. See infra Section II discussion of RAND commitments. 
46. See infra Section II discussion of RAND commitments. 
Wilka - Privacy Commitments - Copyedited_BM (1).docx (Do Not Delete) 8/17/18 2:16 PM 
72 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 93:63 
 
for incentivizing compliance. Finally, it needs to provide a realistic and 
approachable remedy accessible to the public, either through the creation 
(or appointment) of a regulating body or by providing clear and real 
incentives for private rights of actions. 
This paper argues a RAND system in the privacy law context could 
accomplish the above objectives. The paper proceeds by discussing: (1) 
previously proposed IP approaches and their shortcomings; (2) RAND 
commitments, both what they are and how they work in the patent law 
context; and (3) how RAND Commitments could apply in the privacy 
law field. 
I. PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED IP APPROACHES TO PRIVACY 
Scholars and policymakers have sought to address the problem of 
overbroad data use (i.e., lack of respect for privacy) in a number of 
ways. Some highly visible scholars suggest applying IP law concepts to 
the privacy context using different models. Generally, IP approaches to 
privacy have analogized privacy rights to three different categories of 
intellectual property: (A) copyright law; (B) trade secret law; and (C) 
trademark law. 
A. Copyright 
1. Copyright Approach to Privacy Law 
The constitutional purpose of copyright law is “to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”47 The Copyright Act of 1976 grants protection to a 
wide range of “creative or artistic works, including ‘literary works, 
musical works (including lyrics), dramatic works (including 
accompanying music), pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, 
graphic and sculptural works, motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works, sound recordings, and architectural works.’”48 
Jonathan Zittrain discusses copyright law in the privacy context in his 
article, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property 
and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication.49 In the discussion, 
                                                      
47. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
48. Emily S. Day, Double-Edged Scissor: Legal Protection for Fashion Design, 86 N.C. L. REV. 
237, 245 (2007). 
49. Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property and 
Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privacation, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2000). 
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Zittrain looks at some of the common problems faced by those who have 
had their copyrights violated and those who have had their privacy rights 
violated.50 In both contexts, the internet enabled problematic behavior by 
creating increased accessibility and the ability to “copy” material created 
by the owner, whether an artist’s song or a user’s browsing history.51 
Additionally, in both contexts, “monetization” of the “owned” work 
benefits a third party without providing any benefit to the creator.52 In 
the context of music copyright, a torrent site monetizes the work through 
advertisements.53 In the privacy realm, a company monetizes users’ data, 
either directly through targeted advertisements, or through an ad hoc 
approach of selling a customer “profile” to an outside organization.54 
Zittrain’s argument focuses on a “well-designed and trusted” system 
to protect privacy rights, and notably includes a discussion of 
“prevention versus punishment” mechanisms.55 Zittrain points out that in 
both copyright and privacy contexts, punishment can be an incomplete 
remedy to the owner.56 In the music industry, for example, it is has been 
difficult for copyright owners to track all the “pirates” of their 
copyrighted material.57 Generally, a copyright holder is, practically, 
unable to obtain statutory damages from most copyright infringers, even 
when using Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) enforcement 
mechanisms.58 In the privacy context, it is similarly difficult for 
individuals to track all uses of their private information by companies 
like Facebook, Google, and/or their associates.59 Obtaining non-trivial 
                                                      
50. See generally id.  
51. Id. at 1201(“Both law and technology influence such balancing, making it more or less 
palatable to use data for particular purposes—whether one is an individual making a copy of a 
popular song for a friend, or a hospital selling a list of maternity ward patients to a day care 
service.”). 
52. Jason Morris & Ed Lavandera, Why Big Companies Buy, Sell Your Data, CNN (Aug. 23, 
2012, 3:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2012/08/23/tech/web/big-data-acxiom/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/XXJ3-ZEQW]. 
53. How Do BitTorrent Sites like the Pirate Bay Make Money?, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/052815/how-do-bittorrent-sites-pirate-bay-make-
money.asp [https://perma.cc/6R97-ZDZN]. 
54. Zittrain, supra note 49, at 1229 (citing Stacy Collett, Standard in Works for Sharing E-
Customer Data: Ability to Easily Share Information Alarms Privacy Experts, Despite Planned 
Guidelines, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 22, 1999, at 2). 
55. See id. at 1222 (specifically Section C. “Prevention Rather than Punishment of Undesired 
Behavior”). 
56. Id.  
57. Id. 
58. See id.at 1248. The DMCA allows copyright holders to submit “takedown requests” to any 
platform or person reproducing their work without permission. 
59. Id. at 1233. 
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remedies from companies violating user privacy has proven nearly 
impossible.60 
To create a “trusted” system in the copyright arena, the industry used 
technological advancements, such as file encryption and tracking. There 
were also systematic legal changes, including the availability of DMCA 
take-down requests and negotiation of license rights with outside 
companies to stream music and movies (e.g., Pandora or Netflix). These 
two developments curbed the scope of unlicensed use of copyrighted 
material by end users.61 
2. Potential Problems with a Copyright Approach 
Zittrain’s approach was met by several critiques. Zittrain’s article 
focuses on implementing copyright frameworks in a limited sphere of 
privacy law—namely, medical patient privacy.62 In that narrow context, 
the “well-designed and trusted” system approach might lead to 
meaningful improvements. The medical industry has unique statutory 
privacy requirements and well-established privacy rights which could 
enable it to implement Zittrain’s proposed system.63 However, in the 
wider realm of privacy law, the system is more difficult to envision 
because the characteristics of a “trusted” system, and the criteria used to 
measure a “well-designed” system, drastically vary across industries.64 
The system also makes a basic assumption: personal information can 
be “owned” under copyright law. As one scholar noted,65 this could lead 
to a plaintiff, seeking to control his or her personal data using copyright 
law, “feel[ing] initially incongruous: she was seeking to replace the 
personal harm she felt with a commercial one and thus was required to 
                                                      
60. Id.  
61. Id. at 1214–16. Another discussion of the connection between privacy law and copyright is 
discussed in Pamela Samuelson’s paper Protecting Privacy through Copyright?. Pamela 
Samuelson, Protecting Privacy through Copyright?, in PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE: THE 
SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 192 (Marc Rotenberg et al. eds., 2015). However, the discussion in that 
paper focuses on privacy rights in photographic images, including the emergence of “revenge porn” 
and sharing of images that were not willingly provided by the subject, rather than on use of 
materials and data collected directly by companies for users of their service. The focus on images 
also is an area where individuals have traditionally had more control over privacy through both the 
DMCA and publicity rights, and so is only tangentially related to this paper’s topic.  
62. See Zittrain, supra note 49, at 1226–45 (“Medical Data: A Trajectory of Personal Privacy 
Worries—and Responses to Them—in a Digitally Networked Environment”). 
63. Id. at 1237. 
64. Solove, supra note 1, at 1088–89. 
65. In an example involving Dorthy Lewis and Malcolm Gladwell. 
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accept herself as a subject that could be owned.”66 In other words, the 
system reduces the personal details of a user’s life to a quantifiable 
value, which a company can buy away from you. As long as a company 
can afford a fair price, consumers have no right to refuse. 
Another criticism of a copyright approach considers the basic power 
dynamic differences between privacy law and copyright law. In Code: 
Version 2.0, Lawrence Lessig writes: 
The big difference between copyright and privacy law, however, 
is the political economy that seeks a solution to each problem. 
With copyright, the interests threatened are powerful and well 
organized; with privacy, the interests threatened are diffuse and 
disorganized. With copyright, the values on the other side of 
protection (the commons, or the public domain) are neither 
compelling nor well understood. With privacy, the values on the 
other side of protection (security, the war against terrorism) are 
compelling and well understood. The result of these differences, 
as any political theorist would then predict, is that over the past 
ten years, while we’ve seen a lot of legislative and technical 
changes to solve the problems facing copyright, we’ve seen very 
few that would solve the problems of privacy.67 
Personal privacy interests are innately “diffuse and disorganized” 
because they belong solely to individuals without commercial interests 
in the information.68 Expecting individuals to negotiate license 
agreements or require technical standards for organizations with access 
to their information, in the way a large corporation typically would, is 
unrealistic given the disparate negotiation positions of the two parties.69 
B. Trade Secret 
1. A Trade Secret Approach to Privacy Law 
Trade secret law was originally a form of common law tort, later 
encoded as the principles of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.70 The 
                                                      
66. Laura A. Heymann, How to Write a Life: Some Thoughts on Fixation and the 
Copyright/Privacy Divide, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 868–69 (2009). 
67. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 200–01 (2006). 
68. Id. at 200. 
69. Id. at 201 (stating that over the last 10 years, “we’ve seen very few [solutions] that would 
solve the problems of privacy.”). 
70. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9AXF-XW99]. 
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Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been adopted in forty-seven states.71 The 
main objective of trade secret law is to protect commercial entities from 
outside use of their secret information. Also known as the law of 
“commercial morality,”72 trade secret law generally protects formulas, 
patterns, compilations, programs, devices, methods, techniques, and 
processes.73 Trade secret protection extends for as long as the 
information remains secret.74 Generally, a trade secret does not require 
formal registration, and is only codified when a trade secret claim is 
made.75 To successfully bring a trade secret claim, a plaintiff must 
satisfy three basic requirements: (1) the information must have value and 
be a secret (i.e., it was protectable subject matter under trade secret law); 
(2) reasonable efforts must have been made to protect the information; 
and (3) the information must have been obtained through wrongful 
conduct.76 
Pamela Samuelson’s article, Privacy as Intellectual Property?,77 
proposes a trade-secret-based privacy system.78 Samuelson’s approach 
looks at establishing a market right for individuals in their consumer 
data, where online users could force companies to pay for the right to 
use their data, subject to specific restrictions. In other words, individuals 
could “license” their data to companies with a requirement that the 
company keep said data private (i.e., not share it with third parties).79 
                                                      
71. Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Legislative Facts Sheet—Trade Secret 
Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act 
[https://perma.cc/4JVM-ESPH]. 
72. ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 26 (6th ed. 2012). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. James W. Hill, Trade Secrets, Unjust Enrichment, and the Classification of Obligations, 4 
VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 4 n.19 (1999) (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475–76 
(1974) (“The protection accorded the trade secret holder is against the disclosure or unauthorized 
use of the trade secret by those to whom the secret has been confided under the express or implied 
restriction of nondisclosure or nonuse. The law also protects the holder of a trade secret against 
disclosure or use when the knowledge is gained, not by the owner’s volition, but by some ‘improper 
means,’ which may include theft, wiretapping, or even aerial reconnaissance.”)). 
76. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
77. Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (2000). 
78. Id. at 1151. Sharon Sandeen has built on Samuelson’s model system and discussed the 
evolution of privacy law and trade secret law from common law roots, and the different paths the 
two sets of laws have taken. Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can 
Learn from Trade Secret Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 673 (2006). 
79. Samuelson, supra note 77, at 1152. 
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One benefit of the proposal is it would provide doctrinal support to 
consumers without burdensome government regulation.80 
As discussed above, trade secret law evolved from the Uniform Trade 
Secret Act, which was adopted state-by-state until it encompassed the 
vast majority of the country with a uniform standard.81 Privacy law, on 
the other hand, evolved into mismatched and overlapping state statutes, 
niche federal statutes and regulations, and private tort causes of action.82 
Sandeen suggests that privacy law could learn from trade secret law by 
creating a uniform legal schema adopted across states and focusing on 
“reasonableness” to help clarify and develop the legal application.83 
Sandeen’s suggestion has notable benefits, especially in contrast to the 
current hodge-podge of privacy law.84 It would create a uniform standard 
across (hopefully) all fifty states, and by focusing on reasonableness, the 
definition of a violation of privacy could remain flexible and adaptable 
to different circumstances and industry norms.85 
2. Potential Problems with a Trade Secret Approach 
Despite Samuelson’s unique, free-market-supportive proposal, many 
privacy law scholars have dismissed a trade secret approach. One article 
argued that a trade secret approach would not work because American 
law has not adopted the notion of automatic “confidentiality” in 
commercial relationships.86 Without the default right to confidentiality in 
a commercial relationship, American law would not easily stretch the 
definition of confidentiality to cover the relationship between a business 
organization and its customer.87 Another scholar noted, “[i]t is also clear 
that a trade secret must have some economic/commercial consequence; 
that is, the rationale for maintaining secrecy cannot be purely a personal 
matter that goes to feelings of dignity and privacy.”88 
The sharpest criticism of the trade secret approach is that trade secret 
law, in and of itself, has defects capable of bleeding into privacy law: 
                                                      
80. Id. at 1135. 
81. See supra discussion Section II.B.1. 
82. Sandeen, supra note 78, at 677–78, 687. 
83. Id. at 694–95.  
84. Id. at 681 n.84 (discussing the hodge-podge that was unfair competition law before deciding 
there was no common law trade secret doctrine).  
85. Id. at 694, 704.  
86. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 180–81 (2007). 
87. Id. 
88. Eric E. Johnson, Trade Secret Subject Matter, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 545, 556 (2010). 
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Unfortunately, the commercial morality approach doesn’t cure 
the defects of tort-based theories of trade secrecy. “Commercial 
morality” has no more substantive content than “unfair 
competition” or “unjust enrichment”—it still requires some 
external source to determine what behavior is and is not moral. 
To be sure, the commercial morality approach does at least point 
us to an external source—the emergent consensus (if there is 
one) of what constitutes acceptable behavior. But relying on 
such a vague norm to set legal standards has a number of 
problems. It is context and time dependent; normal behavior in 
one industry may end up being illegal in another . . . . It is likely 
to lead to inefficient results, retarding rather than enhancing 
innovation.89 
This critique does not preclude any reasonableness-based approach to 
privacy protection; it simply suggests that reasonableness, without some 
kind of concrete basis of measurement, will likely lead to an impractical 
and inconsistent application of law.90 
C. Trademark Law 
1. A Trademark Approach to Privacy Law 
Under trademark law, “a trademark is any word, name, symbol, or 
design, or any combination thereof, used in commerce to identify and 
distinguish the goods of one manufacturer or seller from those of another 
and to indicate the source of the goods.”91 Under the Lanham Act, a 
trademark can be used to “‘protect the elements of a design that indicate 
the source of the product,’ such as a logo, ‘but does not provide general 
protection for designs.’”92 
Trademarks help brands maintain a prestige premium (i.e., consumer 
trust and goodwill in a brand and its products).93 
                                                      
89. THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 
120 (Rochelle C. Dryfus & Kathrine J. Strandburg eds., 2011). 
90. Id. 
91. Trademark, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/trademark 
[https://perma.cc/BB2J-38MW]; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018). 
92. Day, supra note 48, at 248 (quoting A Bill to Provide Protection for Fashion Design: Hearing 
on H.R. 5055 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman, Ranking 
Member, Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property)). 
93. See Paul Campos, How a Louis Vuitton Bag Can Explain the Higher Education Bubble, 
WEEK (Feb. 26, 2014), http://theweek.com/articles/450341/how-louis-vuitton-bag-explain-higher-
education-bubble [https://perma.cc/TCJ9-46A8]. 
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Several scholars have suggested methods of incorporating trademark 
law principles into privacy law. One author, David Dante Troutt, 
suggests trademark law as a way to take control of, and create 
intellectual property rights in, one’s own identity.94 His discussion, 
however, was more of a social commentary than a true suggestion of a 
system.95 Another author, Paul Ohm, discusses trademark law as a way 
of implementing a notice-and-choice model in his article, Branding 
Privacy.96 Generally, notice-and-choice models of privacy regulation 
presume the best way to protect consumer privacy is to inform 
consumers of an entity’s data use practices and provide a mechanism to 
“opt-out.”97 Ohm suggests implementing notice-and-choice by having an 
entity commit to standards of treatment for private information.98 If the 
company later chooses to change its policy, it would have to change the 
trademark displayed for its product or service in order to notify 
consumers of the change.99 For example, if Facebook were to change its 
privacy practices, it would be required to pick a new name, like 
“Facebook Prime.” Ohm’s suggestion goes beyond the traditional 
notice-and-choice model; it essentially guarantees consumers that the 
companies they provide their personal information will continue 
providing the same level of privacy protection or be forced to surrender 
their trademarks, an unappealing prospect for most profitable companies. 
In part, Ohm’s argument rests on the assumption that because consumers 
are naturally inclined to choose services with strong privacy standards, 
an appropriate privacy-protecting system need only present a consistent 
standard and clear notice when a standard changes.100 
2. Potential Problems with a Trademark Approach 
There are several potential flaws in Ohm’s trademark-based approach. 
The first is the feasibility of changing the entire American trademark 
system to support companies changing their names every time they 
update privacy policies. Currently, an average company will change its 
                                                      
94. David Dante Troutt, A Portrait of the Trademark as a Black Man: Intellectual Property, 
Commodification, and Redescription, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141 (2005). 
95. See generally id. (discussing using trademark law as a way of providing compensation for the 
use of one’s identity, especially for those of color). 
96. Paul Ohm, Branding Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907 (2013). 
97. Id. at 929. 
98. Id. at 945–46. 
99. Id. at 958–59. 
100. Id. at 984–85. 
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privacy policy at least one to two times per year.101 These changes can 
lead to weakened privacy protections for consumers, and often do, but 
can also encompass non-threatening, or even beneficial, changes 
enhancing consumer privacy protections. Examples of useful changes 
include: clarifying language, adding new privacy protections, or adding 
provisions to ensure the company is complying with new laws. Alerting 
the consumer through a trademark, without further explanation, would 
be both heavily burdensome to the company and confusing to 
consumers. 
Moreover, changes in privacy standards are difficult to demonstrate 
because they can be implemented without altering a company’s official 
privacy policy; security and privacy standards are oftentimes 
proprietary, and therefore inaccessible to the public. A company fearing 
giving up a trademark is necessarily incentivized to not update its 
public-facing privacy standards, even when change is beneficial to 
privacy, in order to maintain absolute consistency. The threat of a brand 
identity loss may also incentivize companies to curtail privacy standards 
development altogether to avoid falling below the standard. 
Another problem is Ohm assumes consumers need only be made 
aware of changes to privacy practices, i.e., a notice-and-choice model is 
sufficient.102 In contrast, as one scholar, Frank Pasquale, notes: 
[C]onsumers are not flocking to companies like Facebook and 
Google out of a conscious preference for the privacy policies on 
offer. Rather, they are drawn to such firms because of their fine-
tuning and personalization of search and social network 
services. Each firm’s hostility to privacy may be an important 
reason why they have the data needed to provide such fine-
tuning and personalization, or they may simply be taking 
advantage of near-monopoly status as the highest quality search 
and social network experience. Given the opacity of operations 
at such firms, we may never know how necessary invasions of 
privacy are to their business models.103 
New approaches to privacy law should seek solutions to the 
imbalance in power between companies with near-monopoly market 
positions and disorganized consumers, rather than merely increasing the 
                                                      
101. See, e.g., Previous Privacy Policies, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/privacy/previous 
[https://perma.cc/5BF2-5DSU]; Updates: Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, 
https://policies.google.com/privacy/archive [https://perma.cc/P6XW-SSB9].  
102. Ohm, supra note 96, at 984–85. 
103. Frank Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1009, 1014–15 
(2013). 
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visibility of “take it or leave it” privacy policies. Notice-and-choice 
models have also been criticized for their inability to fully notify 
consumers of the company’s policies and for the lack of real choice on 
the part of the consumer.104 Consumers rarely, if ever, read the privacy 
policies of every site they visit (and would generally find them 
incomprehensible if they tried).105 As Felix Wu states, 
[E]ven if consumers could know perfectly what will happen to 
their data in an immediate transaction, it is virtually impossible 
for them to assess the long-term effects of that transaction on 
their privacy. Online services may also exhibit network effects 
or otherwise have characteristics that make it more difficult for 
consumers unhappy with a company’s privacy policies to move 
to a competitor.106 
II. RAND COMMITMENTS 
As discussed in the previous section, leading scholars have 
considered a variety of IP approaches for protecting privacy. Each 
attempts to create a property right to allow consumers to force 
companies to respect and protect their data. However, all of these 
approaches face a similar barrier to implementation—consumers do not 
have enough power, individually, to assert a property right against a 
large online company. 
This paper asserts that RAND commitments could solve this fatal 
flaw. RAND commitments are a practical, self-regulating, intellectual 
property-based legal tool that would work well in the context of privacy 
law because the RAND system’s core purpose is to address equivalent 
inequities in bargaining power. In the patent sector, beginning decades 
ago, associations within an industry would form and cross-license 
patents among members in order to encourage innovation.107 However, 
those same associations would keep out new competitors without 
valuable patents of their own, and create barriers to entry.108 For 
example, an individual with a patent on a car’s gas tank could prevent 
other companies from manufacturing cars compatible with normal filling 
stations. RAND commitments were created to address the concern of 
                                                      
104. Wu, supra note 43, at 71. 
105. Id.  
106. Id.  
107. Daniel S. Sternberg, A Brief History of RAND, 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 211, 215–17 
(2014). 
108. Id. 
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market suppression by companies, or industry groups, with market-
dominant positions.109 The concerns run parallel with those of online 
data use, where large companies have kept relatively similar, sub-
optimal standards, for the treatment of consumer data. To understand 
how RAND commitments would work for privacy, we first examine 
how said commitments work in patent law. 
Stated broadly, RAND is a commitment made by SEP holders (i.e. 
the market-dominating companies) to offer Fair, Reasonable, and Non-
Discriminatory (FRAND or RAND) license terms to potential 
licensees.110 The framework rests on several important underlying 
concepts: (A) the definition of an SEP and the types of standards an SEP 
can encompass; and (B) the definition of a RAND commitment and the 
types of behavior that can violate RAND commitments. The section also 
examines: (C) how RAND commitments have worked on the ground. 
A. The Fundamentals of Standard Essential Patents 
SEPs are “patents that cover technologies that are considered an 
established standard in a particular industry.”111 In other words, SEPs are 
patents owned by a particular company but necessary for an industry at 
large. There are three basic types of SEPs: de facto, de jure, and standard 
setting organization (SSO) governed. The type of SEP informs different 
levels of obligation by the patent holder (i.e., different standards for 
RAND commitments) and/or different levels of restriction on potential 
licensees (i.e., regulatory requirements). 
A de facto SEP covers technology an industry has adopted as a 
standard over time, by choice, without any conscious coordination or 
formal agreements among industry members.112 The adoption of the 
standard generally occurs after a patent is granted, though in some 
situations adoption may occur before the patent has been published, 
meaning the public does not yet know the technology is being patented. 
One example of a de facto SEP is the JPEG file format. Many entities 
have claimed to have invented the JPEG format, despite its long history 
as a standard in digital photography and electronic images.113 In 2002, 
                                                      
109. Id. at 220–24.  
110. Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Standard Setting Organizations Can Help Solve the Standard 
Essential Patents Licensing Problem, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2013, at 1–3. 
111. Johnson, supra note 38, at 202. 
112. SAADAT MALIK, NETWORK SECURITY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 273 (2003). 
113. Paul Caplan, What Is a JPEG? The Invisible Object You See Every Day, ATLANTIC (Sept. 
24, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/09/what-is-a-jpeg-the-invisible-
object-you-see-every-day/279954/ [https://perma.cc/K8HC-47VQ]. 
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Forgent Networks came forward with a patent granted in 1987 over the 
JPEG format.114 Eventually, prior art was found to invalidate the patent, 
but only after the patent generated years of license fees from companies 
using the standard.115 In the case of the JPEG, the industry not only 
informally adopted the standard, but the standard was so ubiquitous it 
became difficult to identify the original inventor.116 
A de jure SEP is a standard patent imposed on an industry by a 
government organization.117 One example would be encryption 
standards. Government organizations have mandated that particular 
industries, like the financial institution industry, must use certain 
encryption standards when sending financial information over the 
Internet.118 
An SSO SEP is a patent chosen by a SSO to be the standard within an 
industry. An SSO is an institution that develops, coordinates, 
promulgates, and revises technical standards (whether or not patented or 
patentable). An example of an SSO is the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers (IEEE), which uses working groups to choose 
uniform standards for cross-industry applicable technologies.119 When 
an SSO adopts a standard owned under an SEP, it will often oversee the 
licensing and disclosure process with the SEP holder. Many different 
interested parties may weigh in on how an SSO decides to adopt a 
standard, including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ).120 Although SSOs will converse with a 
company and set standards for an industry, they do not set the monetary 
FRAND/RAND royalty rates, avoiding the appearance of price 
manipulation. SSO SEPs are increasingly found at the core of high-
stakes litigation among major players in SEP-reliant industries,121 and 
are the focus of this paper. 
                                                      
114. Matt Hines, Graphic Patent Suit Targets Dell, Others, ZDNET (Apr. 23, 2004, 8:17 AM), 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/graphics-patent-suit-targets-dell-others/ [https://perma.cc/4AKN-
8G3Q]. 
115. James Niccolai, Parts of JPEG Patent Rejected; Forgent to Appeal, COMPUTERWORLD 
(May 29, 2006, 1:00 AM), https://www.computerworld.com/article/2545756/security0/parts-of-
jpeg-patent-rejected—forgent-to-appeal.html [https://perma.cc/H5AD-4AAL]. 
116. Id. 
117. MALIK, supra note 112, at 273. 
118. PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, PCI DSS QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE 16 (Oct. 2010) 
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI%20SSC%20Quick%20Reference%20Guide.p
df [https://perma.cc/ZF58-VH5W]. 
119. Kühn et al., supra note 110, at 1–3. 
120. Id.  
121. Johnson, supra note 111, at 203.  
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B. The Fundamentals of RAND/FRAND Commitments 
FRAND/RAND commitments, in the SSO SEP context, are voluntary 
obligations, undertaken by a SEP holder, to an SSO.122 The terms 
FRAND and RAND are relatively interchangeable: the former stands for 
“Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory” and the latter stands for 
“Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory.” For purposes of this paper, the 
most important concept to understand about RAND commitments is they 
create third-party beneficiary rights. In other words, even though the 
contract establishing a RAND commitment is created between an 
individual SEP holder and an SSO, third parties who wish to license the 
SEP holder’s invention/technology are allowed to challenge any license 
terms they believe are unreasonable or discriminatory.123 
While there is no single definition of what constitutes a fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory license, the following basic aspects 
tend to be fairly consistent.124 “Reasonable” refers to the equitability of 
the set price per use or overall license price of the SEP, generally as 
measured against industry standards, averages, and other related 
factors.125 “Non-discriminatory” refers to keeping both license terms and 
license rates consistent across potential licensees.126 Combined, an SEP 
holder must, in order to comply with a RAND commitment, offer non-
exclusive licenses with standard royalty, restriction, and permitted use 
provisions for all licensees without preferential treatment. Violating a 
RAND commitment creates a breach-of-contract claim for the licensee 
or potential licensee. 
C. Legal Effects of RAND Commitments and Microsoft v. Motorola 
One final important aspect to understand about RAND Commitments 
is how they can be used in a legal proceeding. First, if a defendant 
formally counters a patent infringement claim with a breach-of-contract 
claim, the RAND commitment can be a direct defense to the patent 
                                                      
122. Kühn et al., supra note 110, at 1–3. 
123. Id. 
124. No official body has formally defined what Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory 
licensing schemas are. Anne Layne Farrar et al., Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting 
Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 671 (2007).  
125. Jeffrey I. D. Lewis, What Is “FRAND” All About? The Licensing of Patents Essential to an 
Accepted Standard 9, CARDOZO L. (June 11, 2014), 
https://cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/Lewis.WhatIsFrandAllAbout.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NCD-
HLAF].  
126. Id. at 7. 
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infringement claim.127 Second, an infringement defendant can use 
RAND commitments to demonstrate the plaintiff has not suffered 
irreparable injury, and remedies available at law are sufficient 
compensation.128 Specifically, a defendant can argue that back-royalties 
at a RAND royalty rate are the appropriate remedy. Even if the 
defendant is unable to use RAND commitments to directly counter the 
plaintiff’s claims, the defendant can use RAND commitments as a 
partial shield. Any evidence a plaintiff tried to charge the defendant 
above RAND licensing rates or did anything contrary to the non-
monetary terms set with the SSO can weigh against granting an 
injunction or limit monetary damages.129 
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,130 a Ninth Circuit case from 2012, 
demonstrates how RAND commitments and equity factors weigh into 
the decision to grant an injunction.131 Before its dispute with Microsoft 
began, Motorola submitted standard license terms to several SSOs—
namely, the IEEE and the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU).132 The specific standards referred to Wi-Fi technology and .mpeg 
file formats.133 On October 21, 2010 (after submitting its RAND license 
terms), Motorola offered Microsoft a license agreement for the 
implementation of the SEP technology into several Microsoft products, 
including the Xbox videogame console and Windows operating 
systems.134 The proposed license included a 2.25% royalty rate on the 
final price of the goods.135 Microsoft refused the license on those terms, 
and continued using the patented technology in their products.136 
In 2012, Microsoft brought suit against Motorola, claiming Motorola 
was breaching its contractual RAND commitments.137 Microsoft argued 
it was entitled to licensing under RAND terms with much lower prices 
than those offered by Motorola, and not based on a percentage of final 
                                                      
127. See Doris Johnson Hines & J. Preston (J.P.) Long, Un-FRAND-ly Behavior, 87 BNA PAT. 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 572 (2014).  
128. RealTek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. C-12-03451-RMW, slip op. at 15 (N.D. 
Cal. May 20, 2013).  
129. Lewis, supra note 125, at 5. 
130. 854 F. Supp. 2d 993 (W.D. Wash. 2012), aff’d, 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012). 
131. Id. at 999. 
132. Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 875–76. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 877. 
135. Id. 
136. See id. at 878. 
137. Id. 
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sales prices.138 In response, Motorola claimed the terms were reasonable 
and non-discriminatory, as other licensees had previously agreed to the 
same terms, and also claimed that the right to obtain RAND rates 
requires a preexisting license agreement between the parties, which did 
not exist between Microsoft and Motorola.139 While the case was 
pending in the United States, Motorola filed suit against Microsoft in 
Germany for patent infringement and obtained an injunction against 
Microsoft.140 
The U.S. district court considered the case in two parts. First, it 
considered whether the German decision and its injunctive effect should 
be respected.141 The court decided that by suing in Germany before the 
U.S. court had issued a judgment, Motorola was attempting to forum 
shop and therefore the German injunction had an oppressive effect on 
Microsoft.142 The court of appeals also found that Motorola’s actions had 
frustrated the lower court’s “ability to adjudicate issues properly,” and 
issued an anti-suit injunction on those grounds.143 In the second part of 
the case, the court held that the rates offered by Motorola were 
unreasonable, and Microsoft was not required to have a pre-existing 
license agreement in order to benefit from Motorola’s RAND 
commitments.144 In the court’s discussion of the injunction, the RAND 
finding informed other equity considerations as to the appropriateness of 
injunctive relief.145 The court held that Motorola had not demonstrated 
irreparable injury, and so traditional remedies—namely, monetary 
damages—were sufficient; Motorola was therefore not entitled to an 
injunction.146 The final jury judgment against Motorola, after licensing 
offsets, totaled $14.5 million.147 
                                                      
138. Id. at 879. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 875. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 880. 
143. Id. The factors of consideration the court used were from E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina 
Licores S.A., 446 F.3d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 2006), which are “whether the foreign litigation would (1) 
frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction; (2) be vexatious or oppressive; (3) threaten the 
issuing court’s in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction; or (4) where the proceedings prejudice other 
equitable considerations.” Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 882.  
144. Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 879. 
145. Id. at 885–86. Specifically, the court used the finding in the traditional injunction eBay test 
under factors one and two. 
146. Id. at 880. 
147. Rich Gervase et al., Evolving SEP Jurisprudence and RAND Determinations in Microsoft v. 
Motorola, GLOBAL IP MATTERS (Aug. 21, 2015), 
https://www.globalipmatters.com/2015/08/21/evolving-sep-jurisprudence-and-rand-determinations-
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III. RAND FOR PRIVACY 
This paper suggests RAND commitments are an aspect of intellectual 
property law that would work well in the privacy law context. A privacy 
RAND commitment would consist of the following: (1) companies using 
consumer data would make a commitment to an SSO (discussed in 
section (C)(1) below) to use consumer data only in reasonable and non-
discriminatory ways; (2) consumers would be able to see which 
companies have made RAND commitments in order to inform their 
choice of service provider; (3) the company and SSO would arrange for 
some form of affirmative statement regarding the privacy practices of 
the company in order to demonstrate the reasonableness of the 
company’s practices; and (4) if a consumer, the FTC, or a consumer 
protection agency felt a company had not honored its commitment (i.e., 
had unreasonable or discriminatory practices), the individual or group 
could sue the company for breach of contract as a beneficiary of the 
company’s original commitment to the SSO. Using RAND 
commitments would allow courts to acknowledge consumers’ lack of 
meaningful choice when deciding whether to let online companies use 
their personal information. It would also allow for the development of 
new industry standards for online data use, which could include 
flexibility and tailoring based on company needs and industry 
preferences, and allow consumers to bring claims as individuals or as a 
class action when a company’s behavior becomes unreasonable. 
A. Online Companies Impact Our Everyday Life 
1. Online Companies Often Dominate Online Market Segments 
What does it mean to have a market-dominant position, and why does 
it matter? In the United States, an SEP holder has a duty to potential 
licensees.148 In several other countries, such as Germany, companies 
constitute SEP holders subject to SEP duties only if they have first 
abused a market-dominant position.149 In other words, a company must 
                                                      
in-microsoft-v-motorola [https://perma.cc/24V3-G3Z3].  
148. AIPPI SPECIAL COMM. PATENTS AND STANDARDS, AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
FOR FRAND-COMMITTED STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS 8 (2014), https://aippi.org/wp-
content/uploads/committees/222/Report222AIPPI+report+on+the+availability+of+injunctive+relief
+for+FRAND-committed+standard+essential+patentsEnglish.pdf [https://perma.cc/UM2R-
GMCY]. 
149. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 102, Mar. 
25, 1957, 2012 O.J. (C326) reads: “Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
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hold a market-dominant position in order to become subject to SEP 
licensing obligations. Under both definitions, having a “standard” or 
abusing a market-dominant position is an acknowledgment that the SEP-
holder is in a position to make outrageous demands on any potential 
licensee, which the licensee is forced to accept based on the ubiquity of 
the patented technology within the industry. 
In the realm of privacy, companies with market-dominant positions 
are able to impose whatever terms they want on an individual, offering 
their services on a “take it or leave it” basis, so consumers do not have a 
legitimate choice in how their data is used. While online companies may 
not be true “monopolies,” and still face competition within the market, it 
is undeniable that many companies hold market-dominant positions.150 
The top two search companies, Google and Microsoft, together take up 
85.5% of the online search market.151 Facebook “owns” social 
networking with 30% more market share than its nearest competitors, 
Twitter and Reddit.152 While some market segments include more than 
one company, those markets still tend to be “oligopolies,” containing 
only a handful of major players, all with similar privacy practices.153 For 
example, 50% of all Americans subscribe to Netflix, and 29% subscribe 
to Amazon Prime.154 It is also important to note that many “competitors” 
are not actually market substitutes, i.e., a user cannot simply exchange 
their use of one company with another because the competitors are not 
actually providing the same product or service. For example, only 58% 
of Americans subscribe to any online streaming service, so the Netflix 
subscription population necessarily includes at least 72% of the users 
subscribing to Amazon Prime, making them complementary, rather than 
                                                      
internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.” 
150. Given when market dominance is a measure of the strength of a brand, product, service, or 
firm, relative to competitive offerings. Susan Athey & Armin Schmutzler, Investment and Market 
Dominance, 32 RAND J. ECON. 1, 1–26 (2001). 
151. Todd Bishop, Google’s Market Share Climbs in Latest U.S. Search Stats, GEEKWIRE (Jan. 
15, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://www.geekwire.com/2014/googles-market-share-climbs-latest-u-s-search-
stats/ [https://perma.cc/QRV3-SJ67].  
152. Priit Kallas, Top 10 Social Networking Sites by Market Share Statistics [November 2017], 
DREAMGROW (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.dreamgrow.com/top-10-social-networking-sites-market-
share-of-visits/ [https://perma.cc/QRV3-SJ67]. 
153. Daniel Altman, The New Monopolies, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 7, 2013, 3:45 PM), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/07/the_new_monopolies [https://perma.cc/6Y5T-
QVKU]. 
154. Share of Consumers Who Have a Subscription to an On-Demand Video Service in the 
United States in 2017, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/318778/subscription-based-
video-streaming-services-usage-usa/ [https://perma.cc/S8Z8-SUGL]. 
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interchangeable, products.155 Therefore, a consumer looking to avoid 
using one product may not have a reasonable alternative, meaning that, 
from a practical standpoint, the company has a monopoly. 
Even statistics underestimate the dominant positions of online 
companies. Facebook’s market share is measured against companies like 
YouTube, Twitter, Pinterest, and LinkedIn—companies with very 
different functionality and value to the user.156 It is unlikely that people 
tired of using Facebook would consider YouTube a meaningful 
alternative to stay in touch with friends and family. Even the arguably 
closest substitute to Facebook, LinkedIn, maintains a very different role 
in the market—professional networking versus Facebook’s personal 
networking.157 In the words of one writer, “no one expects . . . Skype to 
take over from Twitter. Though the border incursions do keep dominant 
firms on their toes, they have largely foundered as business ventures.”158 
Just like Microsoft needed Motorola’s exact file format to create the X-
box, consumers “need” (or at least have few alternatives) to use 
Facebook to communicate with friends and loved ones, and unlike 
patented technology, possession of the “winning formula” doesn’t expire 
after twenty years.159 Facebook will never have to release its code for 
other companies to replicate.160 As mentioned earlier in this paper, 
scholars have already taken note of the fact that “consumers . . . are 
drawn to such firms because of their fine-tuning and personalization of 
search and social network services.”161 Due to these industry dynamics, 
there is no Target versus Wal-Mart or McDonalds versus Burger King 
rivalry. Additionally, in these dominated online-market segments, the 
choice to use a service is dependent on community choices and technical 
compatibility. It does not reside solely with a consumer. 
                                                      
155. Id. 
156. Updated Social Media Market Share—March 2013, VISUALLY, http://visual.ly/social-media-
market-share-2013 [https://perma.cc/E2G5-VEAE]. 
157. Founded in 2004, Facebook’s mission is to “give people the power to build community and 
bring the world closer together.” About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info 
[https://perma.cc/SVH9-WXQF]. LinkedIn is “the world’s largest professional network with more 
than 562 million users in more than 200 countries and territories worldwide.” About LinkedIn, 
LINKEDIN, http://press.linkedin.com/about [https://perma.cc/S4ZM-QFUT]. 
158. Tim Wu, In the Grip of the New Monopolists, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 13, 2010, 12:01 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704635704575604993311538482 
[https://perma.cc/7ASK-6V5V]. 
159. See supra section III.C.  
160. Under the Uniform Trade Secret Act, trade secrets are protectable for as long as the 
information is kept secret. See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, supra note 70; WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 19.108.010 (West 2018).  
161. Pasquale, supra note 103, at 1014–15. 
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2. Consumers Have Little Control over What Online Services They 
Use 
Online companies also resemble “standards” in that users often have 
little control over choosing a service. Just as a company who creates a 
part for a phone manufacturer will need to adapt the electricity standard 
the phone uses to ensure compatibility, consumers must use multiple 
online services to participate in modern culture. For example, a student’s 
school e-mail account is frequently provided through Gmail. His or her 
work e-mail is frequently provided through Outlook.162 Facebook and 
LinkedIn both use personal information for direct advertising: all his or 
her family is on Facebook, and LinkedIn is how he or she communicates 
with fellow alumni.163 While a user can try avoiding using geolocation to 
get directions, sign-off of all social media, and use alternative internet 
browsers—to do so essentially eliminates the usefulness of technology 
developed over the past decade. All of the consumer’s daily life is 
affected by technology, and there is no escape. 
3. Online Companies Have a Vastly Superior Bargaining Position in 
Relation to Consumers 
Because online services are so entangled with daily life, and given 
corporate market dominance, consumers have no ability to negotiate the 
terms of their relationship with service providers. In contrast to how 
businesses are often able to negotiate data-protection terms with each 
other,164 individual consumers are left in the “take it or leave it” 
situation.165 As discussed earlier, in privacy law, consumer interests are 
small and diffuse, so, in comparison with most forms of intellectual 
property law, imbalance of power between negotiating parties is much 
                                                      
162. Outlook’s privacy standards and information gathered is governed by the Microsoft Online 
Privacy statement. Microsoft Privacy Statement, MICROSOFT, http://privacy.microsoft.com/en-
us/fullnotice.mspx [https://perma.cc/2FCL-SYPN]. 
163. Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/ [https://perma.cc/82JP-
Z6PX]; Privacy Policy, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/legal/privacy-policy 
[https://perma.cc/M4QS-S67F]. 
164. While specific negotiations are generally confidential and hard to cite directly, the practice 
of negotiating data security clauses in a business-to-business context is so common that IAPP 
releases “standard” contract clauses for integration into contracts. Dana B. Rosenfeld & Alysa 
Zeltzer Hutnik, Data Security Contract Clauses for Service Provider Arrangements (Pro-customer), 
PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY (2011), 
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Rosenfeld_Hutnik_Contract-clauses_Service-
provider.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8J5-K2CJ]. 
165. Pasquale, supra note 103, at 1014–15. 
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greater.166 SEPs create similar problems; the only difference is the 
source of the power. SEP holders benefit from a government-granted 
market-dominant position while online companies benefit from propriety 
technology.167 In the data-use context, it is unclear whether a company’s 
use of personal data is actually necessary to its business models, because 
consumers do not have the ability to negotiate as a group and gain 
insight into why a business wishes to gather said data.168 
B. RAND Commitments Could Accomplish Real Privacy Objectives 
1. RAND Commitments Would Facilitate Accountability 
As discussed in previous sections, visibility into company data 
practices is a necessary prerequisite to setting standards for data use. 
However, companies often will not provide full transparency into their 
data cycle, due to both commercial and security concerns. A RAND 
system would necessarily require insight into data use and sharing in 
order to understand whether a company’s practices were reasonable, but 
could do so in a more practical way than pure public disclosure. RAND 
commitments would require companies to explain and justify their 
information use as reasonable, both from a business perspective and 
from the perspective of the consumer. Even this simple requirement 
would drastically change the landscape of privacy law by giving 
consumers a better view into how companies are actually using their 
data, and helping them understand the true trade-off between utility and 
privacy.169 In addition, a RAND system would present better practical 
methods for companies to disclose the details of their data use than the 
present “privacy policy” disclosure because it would provide avenues for 
disclosure without also disclosing proprietary information to the public 
at large. The disclosure could be made both proactively and 
                                                      
166. LESSIG, supra note 67, at 200. 
167. Patents are generally defined as government granted monopolies. A Patent Is a Government 
Granted Monopoly on an Invention, LAWTEACHER (May 25, 2018), 
http://www.lawteacher.net/commercial-law/essays/a-patent-is-a-government-granted-monopoly-on-
an-invention-commercial-law-essay.php [https://perma.cc/9WZT-TL5E]. 
168. Pasquale, supra note 103, at 1014–15. 
169. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 60 
(2012), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-
protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y2J6-WQ5Y]. (“Commission staff called on industry to make privacy statements 
clearer, shorter, and more standardized; give consumers reasonable access to their data; and 
undertake consumer education efforts to improve consumers’ understanding of how companies 
collect, use, and share their data.”). 
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retroactively. Proactively, companies could disclose via a periodic audit 
by, or periodic reporting to, the SSO, similar to current FTC 
enforcement action requirements and/or business-to-business (B2B) 
contractually-mandated security audits, the results of which could be 
then relayed to consumers without the specific proprietary formulas or 
names of business partners. Retroactively, companies would have to 
respond to discovery requests in connection with the created causes of 
action, in which case trade secrets could be redacted from the 
information provided to the plaintiff. Both avenues for disclosure could 
make use of processes, like third-party audits and periodic reporting, that 
online companies already have in place for non-privacy related business 
processes. 
2.  RAND Commitments Are Workable for the Industry and Provide 
Flexibility While Still Allowing for Regulation 
One of the biggest complaints from the tech industry, particularly in 
regard to enacting new, broader, privacy law, is that regulation is stifling 
and cannot move quickly enough to address changes in technology. Each 
year, technology evolves at a faster rate. While privacy laws in the 
United States have been adapted to effectively regulate specific 
concerns—for example, with children’s privacy through the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)—the United States has failed to 
enact broader federal protections that would curb online companies’ use 
of data. In fact, the United States has mainly focused on notice to 
consumers, rather than focusing on the data use itself. RAND 
commitments would change industry norms by allowing standards to 
adapt year over year, soliciting input from the industry as well as 
regulators and the public, and reflecting ongoing developments in 
technology. 
Similar systems are already in place in the tech industry to address 
other concerns. Founded in 1996, the Interactive Advertising Bureau 
(IAB) in the last two decades has established itself as the creator of the 
default advertising terms for online ad placement through insertion 
order, based on the input of its members.170 Hundreds of leading media 
organizations are now IAB members and rely on the IAB terms, either in 
their original form or with company specific addendums. This model 
demonstrates that even in the presence of competitive forces, technology 
companies can collaborate on “guidelines” for addressing shared 
concerns. Additionally, as discussed in the previous section, most of the 
                                                      
170. About IAB, IAB, https://www.iab.com/our-story/ [https://perma.cc/Q33U-VT7T]. 
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transparency requirements needed to make a RAND system work are 
already utilized by data collectors to address concerns in other business 
segments. Thus, while the use of audits, proactive reporting, and 
responses to discovery requests may add a marginal administrative 
burden, they would not require businesses to make enormous outlays for 
new systems. 
Companies also have incentives to make this system work. At a base 
level, given the recent public relations exposure from privacy violations, 
companies are looking for methods of “signaling” their respect for 
consumer privacy. RAND commitments would include tangible actions 
the market has the ability to reward, enabling both consumer 
participation in privacy law and reputational benefits enhancing 
company value. Signaling has a “virtuous-circle quality: as more people 
signal . . . as a positive reputation signal, the positive reputation signal 
grows in strength.”171 There are also very practical incentives to enacting 
effective self-regulatory systems. Following the introduction of the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), approved in 2016, and 
enforceable starting May 25, 2018, technology companies with an 
international presence will have to overhaul their current privacy 
practices.172 In light of the changes, the industry needs to demonstrate 
that an industry-run regulatory system can work, and ideally work better, 
than new federal and state statutory schemes. This way, they could steer 
the federal government, or progressive individual states, away from 
implementing legislation with burdensome requirements similar to 
GDPR, like the newly-enacted statute in California173 which technology 
companies are already trying to change due to its stringent 
requirements.174 Government systems may also find that a RAND 
system addresses their concerns better than additional legislation would. 
By allowing for private rights of action, FTC follow-on enforcement, 
                                                      
171. Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 44 
CONN. L. REV. 675, 683 (2012). 
172. Megan Leonhardt & Alix Langone, You’ve Probably Received a Ton of Privacy Policy 
Emails This Week. Here’s What’s Changing, TIME: MONEY (May 24, 2018), 
http://time.com/money/5254754/gdpr-privacy-policy-rules/ [https://perma.cc/QE4C-YP7D]. 
173. Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Passes Sweeping Law to Protect Online Privacy, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/technology/california-online-privacy-
law.html [https://perma.cc/Q4VU-FEKX]. 
174. Derek Hawkins, The Cybersecurity 202: Big Tech Is Going After California’s New Privacy 
Law, WASH. POST: POWERPOST (July 3, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity-202/2018/07/03/the-
cybersecurity-202-big-tech-is-going-after-california-s-new-privacy-
law/5b3a4e081b326b3348addc76/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1a4c27be5736 
[https://perma.cc/9UG9-C7WR]. 
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and industry reporting, RAND commitments include avenues for 
governmental enforcement and governmental oversight, but also provide 
more efficient regulation by including the self-regulatory component. 
3. RAND Commitments Support Concrete Enforcement and Remedies 
RAND commitments would create several mechanisms for ensuring 
companies are incentivized to comply with the RAND requirements. 
First, as discussed in previous sections, breaking a RAND commitment 
(in the patent setting) is considered a breach of contract. Similarly, in the 
privacy world, RAND commitments would provide better mechanisms 
for class actions than current statutory rights of action because a breach-
of-contract claim based on a company’s commitments to privacy would 
be uniform across the entire class of consumers in most cases, and not 
subject to mandatory arbitration or damage limitations present in most 
“click-throughs.”175 Judges would also have more leeway to decide 
whether a company was being unreasonable based on its conduct.176 This 
structure would incentivize class-action attorneys to take on 
contingency-fee cases, lessening the monetary burden on plaintiffs. 
Second, RAND commitments introduce a self-regulatory component 
within the industry, because a violation of RAND commitments could be 
considered an “unfair business practice,” which would allow other 
businesses (likely competitors) to bring a suit against a RAND-violating 
company based on the legal theory that the violation negatively affected 
their ability to compete in the market. This type of remedy already exists 
in other legal spaces. For example, in California, including a non-
compete or no-hire clause in a contract can be challenged by a 
competitor as an unfair business practice.177 
Third, RAND commitments would allow for enforcement by the SSO 
itself, which could investigate based on consumer complaints and 
                                                      
175. Class actions, in recent years, have generally had problems meeting uniformity requirements 
due to certain Supreme Court rulings, and this problem has also applied in the privacy context. See 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). For an example of where a privacy violation 
was uniform across a class and therefore met the requirements of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, see In re 
Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., No. 5:10-CV-04809 EJD, 2014 WL 1266091, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 26, 2014) (“Here, Plaintiffs contend the commonality requirement is met because the 
claims of all class members arise from one critical allegation: that Defendant’s system-wide practice 
and policy of storage and disclosure of their search query information was unlawful.”). 
176. See supra section III.C. for an example of how judges can consider reasonableness in RAND 
commitments.  
177. Spencer Hamer, Non-Compete Clauses in California, LAW JOURNAL NEWSLETTERS (Jan. 
2017), http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/2017/01/01/non-compete-
clauses-in-california/?slreturn=20180513185256 [https://perma.cc/Q7FJ-UCNP]. 
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detection of wrongdoing from reviewing periodic reports. Relatedly, 
RAND commitments would benefit current regulatory bodies like the 
FTC. The FTC can already investigate based on deceptive business 
practices and has issued guidance on “reasonable” privacy in its report, 
“Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change,” which 
emphasizes three guiding principles: (1) privacy by design; (2) 
simplified consumer choice; and (3) greater transparency.178 All three 
principles are furthered by a RAND approach. Additionally, the RAND 
system would address another problem in the current privacy regulatory 
space—the FTC’s finite resources. By creating new private causes of 
action and B2B reporting, a RAND system would lower the pressure on 
the FTC to investigate every large technology company, while 
simultaneously leveraging their investigatory resources through the 
added reporting incentives and transparency requirements. 
4. RAND Commitments Would Address Bargaining Power 
Imbalances 
By creating the enforcement mechanisms and enhanced transparency 
discussed in previous sections, RAND commitments strengthen 
consumer bargaining power by amalgamating diffuse interests into a 
collective public good. The result is a relationship that more closely 
resembles two organizations with comparable size, rather than one large 
organization against a mass of individuals. 
Some research has already been done to demonstrate that private 
companies respond to market pressures in the realm of privacy law.179 
Currently, those pressures appear to come from competitors and 
statutory sources, not from consumers.180 By enabling competitor 
reporting and supporting regulatory enforcement, RAND commitments 
would use the pressure of competitors and government bodies to back 
consumer rights. In conjunction with the current change in public 
sentiment regarding privacy rights, RAND commitments should enable 
consumers to exert real influence on industry practices for personal data 
use. 
                                                      
178. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 169, at 22–71. 
179. Kusum L. Ailawadi, Donald R. Lehmann & Scott A. Neslin, Market Response to a Major 
Policy Change in the Marketing Mix: Learning from Procter and Gamble’s Value Pricing Strategy, 
65 J. MARKETING 44 (2001). 
180. See Turow, supra note 4. 
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C. How Could a RAND System Work in Practice? 
1. Finding an SSO 
Organizations, for-profit and non-profit, big and small, have already 
started trying to establish privacy standards for online companies, and to 
hold those companies accountable for their actions. For-profit 
organizations like TRUSTe have tried to create self-regulatory systems 
to signal respect for privacy, but have run into obstacles both in adoption 
and maintaining reputational integrity.181 Non-profit organizations, such 
as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), and the Electronic Privacy Information Center 
(EPIC) have made it their mission to try to protect online consumer 
privacy.182 The non-profit organizations have helped plaintiffs bring 
consumer privacy lawsuits, provide input for proposed legislation, and 
issue advisory reports.183 Many companies considering a large change in 
their privacy policies may, at some point, consult the ACLU.184 
However, their relationships with technology companies are generally 
more adversarial than collaborative. That is not to say that such 
                                                      
181. TRUSTe Settles FTC Charges It Deceived Consumers Through Its Privacy Seal Program, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2014/11/truste-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-through-its 
[https://perma.cc/5EME-WAB6]. 
182. See About, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/about [https://perma.cc/9CC9-
LJ24]. (“Founded in 1990, EFF champions user privacy, free expression, and innovation through 
impact litigation, policy analysis, grassroots activism, and technology development.”); Privacy & 
Technology, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty 
[https://perma.cc/2U8U-5BY7] (“The ACLU works to expand the right to privacy, increase the 
control individuals have over their personal information, and ensure civil liberties are enhanced 
rather than compromised by technological innovation.”); About EPIC, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
http://epic.org/epic/about.html [https://perma.cc/G2K2-K8VH] (“EPIC . . . was established . . . to 
focus public attention on emerging privacy and civil liberties issues and to protect privacy, freedom 
of expression, and democratic values in the information age.”).  
183. See, e.g., ACLU Letter to the Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee Regarding Its 
Report “The Use of RFID for Human Identification”, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/letter/aclu-letter-data-privacy-and-integrity-advisory-committee-regarding-its-
report-use-rfid-human [https://perma.cc/46BD-92FW]; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ENFORCING 
PRIVACY: BUILDING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS TO PROTECT PRIVACY IN THE FACE OF NEW 
TECHNOLOGY AND GOVERNMENT POWERS (2009), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ACLU_Report_-_Enforcing_Privacy_2009.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/89Y2-JLMV]; Apple v. Does, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/cases/apple-v-does [https://perma.cc/5PAK-Y4V5].  
184. See, e.g., Theo Francis, Strange Bedfellows on Health Privacy: ACLU & Microsoft, WALL 
STREET J.: HEALTH BLOG (Oct. 19, 2007, 3:12 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2007/10/19/strange-bedfellows-on-health-privacy-aclu-microsoft/ (last 
visited June 11, 2018). 
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organizations do not play an important, indeed necessary, role in holding 
technology companies accountable for their actions, but their mission 
often necessitates fighting for idealism rather than pursuing 
compromised practicality. 
To maximize buy-in while still protecting organizational integrity and 
concrete changes to privacy practices, a RAND SSO must be seen as 
independent from, but responsive to, industry members. In the realm of 
patent law, that role is filled by no single organization that holds all 
RAND commitments. Instead, multiple SSOs like the American Society 
of Mechanical Engineering (ASME) or the IEEE, became the recipient 
of said commitments.185 In the privacy field, there are already 
organizations that could be viewed as functional equivalents. For 
example, the International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP), 
a non-profit formed in 2000, has become an industry leader in certifying 
individuals with the requisite knowledge to be considered “Privacy 
Professionals.”186 The IAPP also partners with corporate sponsors to 
host industry collaboration on important privacy topics and could be an 
appropriate recipient for initial privacy RAND commitments.187 SOC 
and SOC 2, and related auditing, are self-regulatory standards created to 
support and verify responsible information security practices.188 
Alternatively, the industry could elect to create a new SSO dedicated to 
forming and enforcing RAND commitments. 
One of the best recommenders for a RAND system, and self-
regulatory models generally, is that they are adaptable. If one 
organization proves to be unable to effectively regulate and balance 
industry and public interests, a new organization can take its place 
without having to repeal any existing systems. In fact, allowing for 
multiple standards organizations allows for faster adoption by: (a) 
providing options for companies with specific preferences; and (b) 
allowing competition to clarify an optimal approach. 
2. Expanding on Existing Legislation, in Word and in Deed 
Once a privacy RAND SSO is selected or created, the question 
remains as to what privacy RAND standards would look like in practice. 
                                                      
185. See, e.g., Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 US 556, 572 (1982). 
186. IAPP Mission and Background, IAPP, https://iapp.org/about/mission-and-background/ 
[https://perma.cc/7PK4-BBLC]. 
187. Id. 
188. SOC for Service Organizations: Information for Service Organizations, AICPA, 
https://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/frc/assuranceadvisoryservices/serviceorganization-
smanagement.html [https://perma.cc/XXP5-T7KT]. 
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As discussed above, the FTC has already issued “guiding principles” for 
privacy: (a) privacy by design; (b) simplified consumer choice; and (c) 
greater transparency. Additionally, the FTC has already issued some 
guidance on “unreasonable” practices by prosecuting and entering into 
enforcement actions in particularly egregious cases. 
To create RAND privacy commitments, the SSO, and its industry 
members, could build upon the FTC’s foundation, and the foundation of 
other legislation,189 to go through a drafting and comment process to 
build policies addressing the privacy concerns at every stage of the data 
life cycle. After said policies are finalized and implemented, consumers 
can view the commitments put forth by a company and bring a breach-
of-contract claim (if they believe the policies are unreasonable) at any 
point before, during, or after they commence using the service. The 
commitment, and the right to bring a RAND related claim, is not 
sacrificed if the consumer uses the service. From the company’s 
perspective, the requirements and industry norms become clearer over 
time. If a customer brings a claim against the businesses’ policies or 
actions that seemingly violate its commitments, a judge can issue a 
concrete ruling that will apply not just to that company, but to all other 
RAND-committed companies as well. As a result, the company would 
only have to litigate once, and consumers would all essentially be held to 
the ruling. If the judge ruled against it, the company would have clarity 
in terms of what aspects of its policies were unreasonable, analysis often 
lacking in the current legal environment. Therefore, the company would 
have legal certainty about its position for as long as it chooses to stay 
within its current personal data practices and policies and continue its 
non-discriminatory use of data. The judicial mechanism would provide 
an incentive to the company to continue using a simplified consumer 
choice model. 
The system would also enable implementation of some of the more 
novel approaches to privacy rights. What if a machine learning 
algorithm could be used to anonymize data to the point that it could not 
be re-identified, categorizing users into effective segment profiles, rather 
than using individualized targeting? What if an algorithm could be 
created to effectively weed out falsified articles, or advertisers with 
inappropriate content? Technical advancements with the mission of 
                                                      
189. Other legislation includes current state laws in privacy-progressive states like Massachusetts, 
Illinois, and California, and industry-specific legislation like COPPA and HIPAA. LEUAN JOLLY, 
DATA PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW, WESTLAW: PRACTICAL LAW 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I02064fbd1cb611e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.html?c
ontextData=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=true (last visited June 24, 2018). 
Wilka - Privacy Commitments - Copyedited_BM (1).docx (Do Not Delete) 8/17/18 2:16 PM 
2018] PRIVACY COMMITMENTS 99 
 
protecting user privacy are already theorized. One set of academics 
analyzed a new machine-learning system called Chiron which attempts 
to anonymize training data for machine learning.190 If an algorithm 
works better than a policy, SSOs could require or recommend the 
technology as a best practice. 
To summarize, a RAND system will allow regulation to exist in a 
space between a mere principle and a stiff exacting requirement, 
allowing for the development of an applicable body of case law while 
still preserving the ability to adapt over time. Additionally, it does not 
have to hold to a pre-conceived idea of what a secure private system 
looks like, and can therefore examine new behavioral and technical 
solutions, perhaps managing to better predict and manage new privacy 
issues before they affect the public. 
D. Concerns with a RAND Approach 
1. Making Assertions Concrete 
The first potential critique of a RAND system is that companies will 
not be forced to create clearer standards through RAND commitments 
than they already have under their opaque privacy policies. This paper 
argues that RAND commitments will help companies move towards 
clearer, more concrete commitments in two ways. First, if a company 
has clear standards, those standards will provide a litigation advantage 
and, as discussed above, will drastically decrease the company’s overall 
litigation volume. For example, it would be much easier for a company 
to demonstrate the reasonableness of a data retention period of six 
months compared to a commitment that it was keeping data as long as 
reasonably necessary, because one is inherently easier to measure than 
the other, and does not require proof that retention was reasonably 
necessary. Second, even if only a small number of companies initially 
steer towards clearer commitments as a way to avoid litigation, their 
commitments will help create industry standards. In response to the 
development of standards, other companies will begin making their 
policies clearer as a way of ensuring they are not seen as a target for 
litigation or press that could hurt their public image. Essentially, the 
implementation of a RAND regime will result in a self-improving 
system; early adapters build the base standards, and in doing so, 
demonstrate the positive benefits of enacting said standards. Eventually, 
                                                      
190. See generally Tyler Hunt et al., Chiron: Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning as a Service, 
ARXIV (Mar. 15, 2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.05961.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BR3-GAHF]. 
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those who refrain from making RAND commitments will face clear 
operational, legal, and reputational disadvantages compared to others 
within the industry. 
2. Legally Demonstrating that a Company Violated Its Commitments 
The next concern critics may raise is the difficulty of proving that a 
company violated its privacy commitments. The solution to this problem 
lies in shifting the burden to a company to show that its policies were 
reasonable, once the consumer has pled basic facts demonstrating that 
the average consumer could find the practices unreasonable. Proving that 
a company violated its commitments will also be easier to prove 
because, as discussed above, RAND commitments inherently define 
standards over time in measurable ways in contrast to the muddied 
waters of the present legal schema. The clearer the assertion, the less 
difficult it is for a plaintiff to support said assertions through discovery. 
Additionally, as privacy commitments would be consistent across all 
consumers, a named plaintiff could represent the reasonable consumer, 
allowing for a unified class more capable of bringing a successful class 
action. 
3. Incentivizing Companies to Begin Making RAND Commitments 
The final critique of this approach is that companies might not make 
RAND privacy commitments because they want privacy standards to 
remain unclear, preventing the system from gaining traction. This 
argument was brought up when RAND commitments were first 
presented in patent law. The argument was refuted fairly quickly when 
Samsung, Apple, Microsoft, Motorola, and many other companies chose 
voluntarily to make RAND patent commitments.191 In fact, RAND 
policy (although initially present only within the United States) has 
already been accepted throughout much of Europe and Asia.192 The 
benefits to adopters—given the intraoperative nature of the market and 
incentivized commitments—created an industry norm of SEP holders 
                                                      
191. See generally Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012); Apple, Inc. v. 
Samsung Electronics Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
192. Michael Frohlich, FRAND and Injunctive Relief, AIPPI (July 2012), 
https://www.aippi.org/enews/2012/edition25/Michael_Frohlich.html [https://perma.cc/9WEM-
6ZDN]; Florian Mueller, UK Judge Does Not Consider EU Court Case a Reason to Stay FRAND 
Rate-Setting and Damages Cases, FOSS PATENTS (May 8, 2013), 
http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/05/uk-judge-does-not-consider-eu-court.html 
[https://perma.cc/BVG4-QSTW]. 
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using RAND licensing.193 Those who adopt RAND privacy 
commitments obtain multitudinous benefits: clearer legal expectations 
and standards, lower litigation volume, and a level playing field within 
the industry. While there is no way of knowing with absolute certainty 
that privacy RAND commitments would be used by companies until the 
option is presented, the investment needed to set up the framework is 
minimal given the self-regulatory nature of a RAND system. 
Additionally, as discussed in previous sections, the digital services 
industry is currently incentivized to create its own concrete obligations 
to avoid rigid and inconsistent regulation being enacted by applicable 
governing authorities. RAND commitments would allow technology 
companies to do what they do best, find innovative business and 
technical solutions to solve consumer concerns.  
CONCLUSION 
Many scholars have attempted to place privacy protections into the 
framework of intellectual property, but thus far their proposals have 
been hard to operationalize. One explanation for this difficulty is the 
common feature of the proposals—providing a property right to the 
consumer, who as an individual is unable to exercise the right in a 
meaningful way. In contrast to other intellectual property approaches, 
RAND commitments inherently consider inequity in bargaining 
positions and compensate for the imbalance. RAND commitments are 
also self-regulatory, allowing rapid and flexible adoption. The principle 
inducement for using RAND commitments is that the framework 
benefits both companies and consumers. The consumer is given a clear 
and demonstrable cause of action based on reasonable expectation; the 
company is given a flexible but consistent standard. Additionally, 
outside stakeholders have the opportunity to provide input and suggest 
standards for the industry. While there is no guarantee that RAND 
commitments would create meaningful legal reform, the low cost of 
implementation and self-regulatory nature means that adoption has a 
very low chance of causing any detrimental effects to either the law or 
the industry. For these reasons, the implementation of RAND 
commitments should be considered in the context of privacy law. 
  
                                                      
193. Jennifer Vanderhart, F/RAND – The Economic Incentives and a Discussion of Microsoft v. 
Motorola, MONDAQ (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/260112/Patent/FRand+The+Economic+Incentives+And+A
+Discussion+Of+Microsoft+V+Motorola [https://perma.cc/Z8FB-BNFX]. 
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